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The second globalization regime has created opportunities for exploiting the benefits of 
productive specialization and the mutual advantages of trade in goods, services, and 
financial instruments on an unprecedented scale. A considerable number of countries, 
especially in Asia, have managed to take advantage of such opportunities. However, the 
regime also has a dark side. There have been periods of substantial volatility of the 
exchange rates between major reserve currencies, cycles of abundance and scarcity of 
international liquidity, and sudden reversals in the direction of capital flows associated 
with crises and flight-to-quality episodes.  
 
A source of concern is that, despite higher exchange-rate flexibility, deeper capital 
markets, and freer cross-border financial flows, the system’s built-in adjustment 
mechanisms have not always worked appropriately. This is true of both the mechanisms 
operating at the national and the global levels: the market reactions and policy responses 
observed under the existing international financial architecture (IFA) and domestic 
financial architectures (DFA) have frequently been unable to induce timely and smooth 
corrections of current account and/or capital account disequilibria and, as a 
consequence, the economies affected have undergone periods of “disruptive 
adjustments”. Two additional disappointing features are first, that the accumulation of 
tensions in many instances resulted in growth and financial collapses or “crises” and 
second, that these crises proved to be “contagious”.  
 
If we based our judgment on observed overall economic outcomes, we would see that 
the LA region has been living mostly on the dark side of the global system. In addition 
to experiencing several crises, the region’s “normal” aggregate income volatility has 
been substantially higher than that in developed countries over the last three decades. 
Furthermore, consumption has tended to be more volatile than income while investment 
volatility has been larger than international standards. Indeed, the region’s growth was 
higher and volatility was lower under the Bretton Woods regime. This is particularly 
true with regard to the three largest economies. These economies have shown a 
mediocre growth performance and vulnerability to external financial shocks (ECLAC, 
2008). The most notable exception to this regional picture is Chile and to a certain 
extent the Dominican Republic. But even in these cases, financial crises have not been 
absent. In Chile, the growth path consolidated only after the occurrence of a deep 
financial crisis, which was one of the first under the second globalization and 
anticipated several of the features that would characterize the crises in the emerging 
world. In the Dominican Republic, the growth process was interrupted by deep financial 
disequilibria at the beginning of the current decade. Neither of the two exhibits a growth 
performance that is comparable to the Asian miracles.   
 
The contrasting performance of LA and Asia is just one example of the striking 
disparities observed in the growth and macro volatility paths of different economies 
around the world. Over the last three decades economic miracles persistently coexisted 
with recurrent financial and growth collapses. Real-side and political phenomena–such 
as uneven changes in productivity throughout the world, terms-of-trade shocks, the 
demise of the Socialist Bloc, and the 2001 terrorist attack–can go a long way in 
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explaining the different performances and international instability. Yet, there is 
abundant evidence that the failures in the governance of global financial transactions 
have also played a significant role. After the occurrence of a shock, the degree of 
persistence of the ensuing disequilibria and the stability of the adjustment process 
depend crucially on the system’s ability to “filter” or dampen the effects of the shock. If 
the system tends to generate disruptive adjustments, any sizable shock could destabilize 
the system.  
 
The IFA and the IFA-DFA linkages play a critical role in the process of filtering shocks 
for two reasons. One, they are central determinants of the efficiency and degree of 
completeness of the structure of financial and monetary markets; two, they also 
determine the quality of the policy responses in those cases in which public intervention 
is required because of the existence of market failures that may give rise to a disruptive 
adjustment.  
 
Three features of the current global situation are indicative of shortcomings in the IFA: 
the persistence of international imbalances, the popularity of self-insurance strategies in 
the emerging world, and the succession of financial collapses that were neither 
anticipated nor efficiently managed within the existing regulatory frameworks. This 
suggests that a change in the IFA rules is necessary for financial and monetary 
interactions to produce a cooperative equilibrium that is superior to the observed 
(probably sub-optimal) global outcome. 
 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, the international financial 
architecture (IFA) has fallen under severe scrutiny. Several reform proposals have been 
advanced and, in fact, some initiatives promoted by the G-20 have already been 
implemented. A recent United Nations Report (UN, 2009) has forcefully called 
attention to the significance of financial instability and crises for emerging countries and 
advanced a number of initiatives to reform the IFA so as to make it more stable and 
development-friendly. Likewise, the crisis-resolution initiatives and the changes in the 
regulatory framework in developed countries have had consequences on cross-border 
financial flows because they impinge on the incentives facing global financial 
institutions, governments, and investors.  
 
The concerns about the IFA’s ability to govern international financial transactions and 
the debates about its reform, nonetheless, are far from new. These concerns have been 
part and parcel of the process of a continuous increase in financial flows that took place 
during the “second globalization” regime, which consolidated after the demise of the 
Bretton Woods system in the 1970s. This is only natural in light of the existence of a 
dark-side that the rules and organizations of the IFA were unable to eliminate. 
 
The consensus on the need to reform the rules that govern international financial 
relations so as to prevent coordination failures is firm. But the views about the content 
and scope of the reforms vary. This is not surprising because the process involves 
several countries and international organizations with different preferences, which must 
satisfy different constituencies. Furthermore, the proposals differ concerning the level –
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regional and/or multilateral– at which the reforms should be implemented and what the 
organizations in charge of building the new institutional framework should be. In this 
regard, the post-crisis developments in the 1990s and 2000s indicate that institution 
building at the regional level will probably be an important component of the reform. 
The EU is de facto playing a central role in coordinating the responses to the crises and 
their consequences. The public debt crisis in Greece is a natural example. Indeed, as 
part of the initiatives to deal with this crisis, there have been proposals to create an 
European Monetary Fund. Likewise, the Chiang Mai initiative was a regional response 
to the inability of the IFA to ensure liquidity provision in Asia (Park, 2008).  
 
In designing the IFA reforms, it is important to take into account the lessons learned 
from the crises that occurred under the second globalization regime and, in this regard, 
LA is a rich source of stylized facts. For one thing, since the end of the relatively calm 
Bretton Woods period, several LA countries have experienced at least one important 
crisis associated with episodes of capital flow reversals. In the context of freer capital 
and trade flows, exceptionally large growth collapses occurred when financial and real 
perturbations (for example, interest rate and terms of trade shocks) arose 
simultaneously.  
 
By the late 1990s, a good number of governments and analysts in LA perceived that the 
rules and the organizations of the IFA were not helping to reduce volatility and prevent 
crises. While we can signal some cases in which the actions of international financial 
institutions (IFIs) contributed to managing volatility and crisis, many leading cases 
showed that the financial resources these institutions provided to counterbalance capital 
outflows and ease credit crunches did not suffice to smooth aggregate fluctuations. 
More often than not, the conditionality attached to the funds did not help, either.   
 
The failures in the functioning of the IFA created incentives for LA countries to seek 
non-cooperative solutions to the problem of managing the consequences of external 
financial shocks. The evolution of the region prior to the 2008 crisis is particularly 
telling. To prevent the repetition of the financial stress of the 1990s, many LA countries 
adopted self-insurance strategies (see Fanelli and Jimenez, 2009). These strategies led 
the region not only to improve the macroeconomic fundamentals –fiscal and current 
account surpluses– but also to accumulate large amounts of international reserves. It can 
be argued that, as a best policy response, the self-insurance strategy leads to outcomes 
that are sub-optimal from the point of view of the global economy. On the one hand, 
this strategy has a “mercantilist” component –a higher current account surplus induced 
by the depreciation of the exchange rate– that does not help to reduce existing global 
imbalances. On the other, the strategy has a portfolio component –a higher demand for 
international reserves– that can reduce excessively the interest rates in those few 
economies that have the capacity to issue safe financial instruments, exacerbating the 
probability that a bubble occurs. In this sense, the IFA’s reform should aim to 
coordinate the actor’s responses to achieve the best outcome so as to transform self-
insurance into a dominated strategy. This is no minor issue if we consider that many 
other emerging countries, especially in Asia, have also followed a self-insurance 
strategy in the last decade.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section II analyzes the meaning and scope of the 
IFA. It is striking that, despite the discussions on global architecture, no generally 
accepted definition of the IFA exists. We also elaborate on the nature of the reforms of 
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the IFA.  We will argue that the reform should be conceived as an institution-building 
exercise to be undertaken at the national, regional, and multilateral levels and that the 
way in which institutions are built has a bearing on the sense of political legitimacy and 
the policy ownership of the actors involved. Section III uses the concepts developed in 
the previous section to review the LA experience with the IFA during the second 
globalization. We will try to identify lessons that can be useful to clarify the problems 
that the international community is facing concerning the IFA reform. We focus on the 
role of the IFIs, standards and codes, and crisis-prevention and crisis-resolution 
mechanisms. We argue that the flaws in these mechanisms have had a bearing on the 
popularity of self-insurance in the region and, thus, contributed to the persistence of 
global imbalances. Section IV presents the main conclusions of the paper. 




II. The IFA: scope and meaning 
 
 
The content of the IFA reform agenda evolved in response to the demands for policy 
coordination and institutionalization that accompanied the increasing consolidation of 
the second globalization regime. Key to this were the repeated events of liquidity 
squeeze and balance of payments disequilibria, which frequently produced financial 
collapses in developing countries–including cases of default on sovereign debt and 
forced restructuring. Consequently, the search for mechanisms to prevent and manage 
crises and to secure international liquidity provision took increasing priority on the 
agenda. In this way, in the mid-2000s the IMF and the WB, the two core organizations 
of the IFA, were able to manage a well-defined agenda for the reform of the IFA. By 
that time, in reference to the ongoing IFA reform, the WB stated that the IFA “refers 
broadly to the framework and set of measures that can help prevent crises and manage 
them better in the more integrated international financial environment”. In line with this,  
“the agenda for crisis prevention and crisis resolution deal with weaknesses in the 
international financial system that potentially contribute to the propensity and 
magnitude of global instability, hence requiring collective action at the international 
level. But there is widespread recognition that global financial stability also rests on 
robust national systems and hence requires enhanced measures at the country level as 
well”.2 There are a number of issues in this description of the mid-2000s IFA agenda 
that we would like to highlight because they are central to our analysis.  
 
1. International financial governance and institutional change 
 
The essential mission of the IFA is to provide effective governance structures for 
international financial transactions so as to facilitate the integration of the national 
financial systems with global capital markets while simultaneously preserving the 
stability of the process. Since effective governance requires appropriate norms and 
practices, institutional change is inseparable from the implementation of the IFA 
agenda.   
 
The fulfillment of the IFA functions embraces rules and activities that are related to the 
microstructure and to the systemic dimension of financial intermediation. Dixit (2007) 
states that the object of analysis of economic governance embraces three elements: 
institutions, organizations, and collective action problems. This is because governance 
includes the institutions and organizations that underpin economic transactions and the 
collective action problems that must be solved to provide the infrastructure of rules, 
regulations, and information that are needed to lend feasibility or workability to the 
interactions among different economic actors.  
 
The main rationale for investing in institutions and organizations for the governance of 
cross-border financial transactions is that these transactions contribute to increasing 
global welfare. The governance structures must not only reduce transaction costs at the 
microeconomic level, related to information and moral hazard, but also imperfections 
that are associated with cross-border interactions–such as spillovers (externalities) and 
                                                 
2 See http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/ifa_more.html 
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strategic complementarities–as well as anti-competitive practices encompassing 
regulations and supervision, such as free riding via regulatory arbitrage and financial 
protectionism, which could result in prisoners’ dilemma situations.  
 
The spillover effects that have a bearing on financial stability and international liquidity 
provision are especially relevant to the IFA. Should a large cross-border financial 
conglomerate fail, for example, the effects are likely to spill over to other national as 
well as international entities directly or indirectly related to it. Financial interactions 
may also give rise to phenomena such as contagion that are not necessarily driven by 
fundamentals. If the spillover is strong enough, the stability of some national financial 
systems could be jeopardized and, consequently, the authorities are likely to take these 
factors into account when designing local regulations. This creates a linkage between 
the DFA and the IFA. Strategic complementarities may arise when some financial 
centers impede the development of new regional centers because of scale economies, as 
in the case of ADRs in LA, which restrain the development of domestic bond and stock 
markets and may give rise to a low financial development trap (see de la Torre et al., 
2006).  
 
Financial spillovers have a bearing on the international liquidity provision mechanisms 
via their impacts on market and funding liquidity. In the case of emerging economies, 
liquidity shocks originating in the international system usually take the form of sudden 
stops and flight-to-quality events that provoke a credit crunch accompanied by abrupt 
falls in transactions in bond and stock markets. Under these conditions liquidity 
squeezes may produce solvency problems and stock prices may become very volatile 
because arbitrage becomes a highly risky activity. These phenomena typically put the 
stability of the financial system under high pressure. The market and policy responses–
increases in interest rates, depreciation of the currency or the loss of international 
reserves–may induce severe macro disequilibria. Due to these kinds of dynamics, many 
authors have argued in favor of complementing micro- with macro-prudential measures, 
as well as with the overall macroeconomic regime (see Ocampo, 2003).    
 
International financial relations may also create opportunities for some countries or 
financial centers to profit from free riding. For example, a country could relax its 
financial regulations in order to “steal” investors from countries in which regulations are 
tougher or to profit from tax evasion or money laundering. Likewise, in the event of a 
crisis, central banks could provide special support to domestic financial entities via 
guarantees or lending at subsidized rates, harming foreign competitors without access to 
such facilities. This was the case in the 2008 crisis. 
 
Hence, the international community needs to design and enforce appropriate governance 
structures, which are able to:  
(a) Facilitate international financial transactions among international parties 
(b) Ensure the consistency between the domestic and international regulatory 
frameworks, particularly those norms that impinge on stability and regulatory 
arbitrage  
(c) Ensure that international financial transactions improve rather than impede the 




The scope of the institutional reforms required to meet these goals is ample and the 
corresponding agenda has a multilateral and a national dimension because it is 
necessary to harmonize the characteristics of the local financial and monetary 
institutions (the DFA) so that they concur with the IFA rules and the practices that 
govern global financial and monetary transactions. Important inconsistencies between 
the DFA and the IFA could trigger market distortions and, ultimately, financial 
instability. This means that the implementation of the agenda calls for significant 
coordination and cooperation concerning the worldwide institution-building efforts, 
which involve a variety of international bodies of different nature and functions, not to 
mention the national polities3.  
 
The absence of a global polity poses constraints on the range of institutional options. 
More specifically:  
(a) The existing patterns of interactions and practices in the international financial and 
monetary spheres may result in undesired outcomes (i.e. coordination failures, 
suboptimal equilibria, or crises) and this situation calls for concerted actions by the 
international community to improve the outcome.  
(b) No world government exists, which means that: 
- There is no global tax payer and thus the resources required for guaranteeing 
the functioning of the system must be provided voluntarily  
- There are no generally accepted and “hard” punishment mechanisms to help to 
enforce the rules of the financial game. Surveillance and restrictions on choices 
concerning policies, regulations, and practices must largely be voluntarily self-
imposed. 
(c) There are substantial asymmetries in economic and political power within the 
“international community”, which means that there is a risk of capture and distributional 
conflicts and problems of legitimacy. This may harm the ability of the international 
community to act collectively. 
 
2. The IFA instruments for the coordination of decentralized institutional change 
 
The efforts that have been made to adapt the institutions of the IFA to the changing 
global conditions and to ensure the consistency between the IFA and the DFA have 
some characteristics hat deserve mention.   
 
(a) Some efforts were made to guarantee a certain degree of harmonization between the 
global and the national blueprints used in the financial institution-building works. The 
instruments to induce the convergence of the different DFAs toward a common design 
were the standards and codes issued by different bodies. To strengthen the coordination 
of the process, the FSF was created in 1999 (later renamed FSB) whose mission was to 
compile the standards recommended for the different spheres that had a bearing on 
financial and monetary transactions. There were also attempts to develop a “Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring Mechanism” intended to provide a framework for bankruptcy 
procedure; a  code for debtors and creditors aimed at developing a market-based 
voluntary and flexible framework (the “Draft Principles for Stable Capital Flows and 
                                                 
3 On international coordination see Meyer et al., 2002. 
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Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets”); and guidelines for collective action 
clauses to be included in bonds terms.    
 
(b) The global and local organizations had to cooperate in the supervision and 
management of the institutional work in progress, as well as the overall functioning of 
the system. These latter activities included the supervision of the usual financial 
practices, macroeconomic surveillance and, eventually, the coordination of policy 
responses to shocks. The leading role at the global level was delegated to the World 
Bank and the IMF. The developed countries (say, the G7) concentrated the decision 
power to govern these institutions; that is, the G7 was in the driver’s seat. In an attempt 
to create stronger ownership of reforms the G20 was created in 1999 as an instance for 
policy dialogue.     
 
(c) To strengthen coordination and the sense of ownership of the IFA reforms, it was 
necessary to institute common values and a sense of shared missions among the 
participants. This role was played by the market-friendly approach to reforms. The 
approach evolved from ad-hoc additions to traditional IMF-conditionality during the 
1980s, to the ten Washington-Consensus recommendations of the early 1990s and 
ultimately crystallized in the so-called second-generation reforms. The second-
generation reforms entailed wide-range institutional changes, well beyond financial and 
monetary issues (Fanelli, 2007).     
 
In sum, the main goal of all these activities was to coordinate a process of decentralized 
institutional change. But, in addition to coordination, the implementation of the IFA 
agenda required considerable political support on the part of national polities. The 
decisions power concerning the reform of domestic institutions was in the hands of the 
national governments and at stake was not just policy surveillance or consultation on, 
say, fraudulent financial practices but sizable institutional reforms. This gave rise to 
complex political-economy issues.  
 
To begin with, the viability of the reforms came to depend not only on the commitment 
of the polities but also on their ability to build a political consensus on the convenience 
of reforming the DFA and investing society’s resources to support the IFA. Cheap talk 
alone was not enough to meet the coordination needs. The IFA had to provide 
appropriate incentives to attract the commitment of the polities.  
 
The incentive structure would have to be suitable to induce the cooperation of two 
different kinds of players. In effect, the main interest of emerging countries was to 
secure liquidity provision under situations of stress, financial and political support for 
crisis resolution, and the promotion of domestic financial deepening. For developed 
countries the main goals were to gain free access to financial services industries in 
emerging economies, to protect foreign creditors’ rights, and to avoid moral hazard in 
lending related to liquidity provision and crisis resolution. To deal with crisis prevention 
the main tools were, first, surveillance –via Article IV consultation and Financial Sector 
Assessment Programs (FSAP)– and, second, initiatives aimed at promoting international 
standards and good practices. This would strengthen the transparency and accountability 
of the financial system. As to crisis mitigation and resolution, the main initiatives were 
the Contingent Credit Lines (CCL)–which were discontinued in November 2003–and 
the improvement of the framework to restructure the debt.      
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In sum, as the post-Bretton Woods regime unfolded, it became clearer that a structure 
for the governance of international financial and monetary transactions called for the 
coordination of both policies and national institutions. From this point of view, the 
degree of political commitment that the new regime would demand from national 
polities proved to be stronger than Bretton Woods rather than weaker. This is somewhat 
paradoxical because one important cause of the demise of Bretton Woods was its 
inability to coordinate national fiscal and monetary policies in the context of a fixed 
exchange rate regime and floating was envisaged as an exit option–an option that could 
make different choices of domestic policies compatible with global equilibrium. This 
was expected to free the polities from the constraint posed by increasing globalization. 
But in the end, more monetary autonomy was ultimately bought at the cost of tighter 
requirements for the coordination of domestic institutions. Far from freeing domestic 
polities from the constraints stemming from the global economy, the need to ensure 
global governance called for the polities to take a more active role in reforming the rules 
of the financial and monetary games.      
 
In hindsight, it can be said that the results of the efforts to implement the agenda 
significantly differed from the expectations. For one thing, concerning crises, the IFA 
reforms were unable to preclude the occurrence of events of severe financial instability. 
Furthermore, those countries that followed the market-friendly agenda and were 
supposedly firmly integrated with world capital markets, such as the so-called PIGS, 
experienced financial instability. Likewise, despite the importance given to crisis 
prevention in emerging countries, the periphery of Europe repeated the mistakes of the 
1990s (unsustainable debt paths and balance of payments disequilibria). Finally, the 
attempt to organize collective action at the global level simply failed. Two main 
indicators of this failure were the generalization of self-insurance strategies among 
developing countries and the existence of persistent current account imbalances 
involving both developed and developing countries. The popularity of self-insurance 
meant that the crisis prevention mechanisms designed by the IFIs were either useless or 
politically too costly. The imbalances, in turn, suggest that the system’s self-regulatory 
mechanisms were not working efficiently (see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009; Obstfeld et 
al., 2008). 
  
Based on this analysis of the meaning and scope of the IFA and the character of the 
institutional changes involved in the reforms, we will now briefly review the LA 
experience with the IFA during the second globalization in search of lessons that could 
help to face the challenges that the IFA reform currently poses.     
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III. From financial liberalization to self-insurance in LA 
 
One of the most influential facts, insofar as the impact it had on LA, was the worldwide 
process to deregulate national financial systems and capital accounts, which gained 
momentum after the fall of Bretton Woods. It was accompanied by the formation of 
large global financial conglomerates, an ever-increasing variety of financial 
instruments, and strengthened foreign direct investment. Higher integration was 
expected not only to improve access to new sources of finance and more sophisticated 
risk-management instruments but also to promote domestic financial deepening. As part 
of these efforts one country after another opened their capital accounts and deregulated 
their national financial markets. Indeed, the Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Chile, 
and Uruguay) were world pioneers with respect to financial liberalization in the 
emerging world.  
 
By the late 1990s, however, it was clear that reaping the benefits of financial integration 
would be more difficult than had been envisaged (see Díaz Alejandro,1985; McKinnon, 
1991). A prominent obstacle was the financial opening’s correlation with increased 
financial instability and vulnerability to external shocks (Ocampo, 2003). Domestic and 
international factors contributed to these disappointing results.  
 
On the domestic side, financial deregulation proved to be institution-building intensive 
owing to the reasons discussed earlier. It was not just a matter of lifting financial-
repression measures, such as ceilings on interest rates or mandates on credit allocation. 
It was necessary to re-build the entire DFA so as to adapt the institutions (i.e. legal 
infrastructure and regulations) and organizations (i.e. regulatory and supervisory bodies) 
to a deregulated environment (Ocampo and Griffith-Jones, 2009, Fanelli, 2008).  
 
The integration with global capital markets via capital account deregulation was also 
problematic. Capital flows proved to be volatile, pro-cyclical, and prone to sudden 
stops. This was related with two facts: one, the distorted incentives created by ill-
designed institutional frameworks which gave rise to unstable liquidity conditions, 
excessive current account deficits, and recurrent public debt sustainability problems (see 
Ocampo, 2003; ECLAC, 2008); two, the inability of the IFA to internalize the 
externalities created in the deregulation process, which took the form of  contagion and 
regulatory arbitrage.  
 
After dealing with the “lost decade” triggered by the debt crisis of 1982 and the turmoil 
associated with the Mexican financial crisis of 1994-95, the LA policy makers were 
fully aware that the deregulation process tended to generate systemic vulnerabilities. 
The following stylized facts are representative of the types of phenomena that were 
observed in the region:  
• Financial stress, associated with sudden changes in risk aversion and domestic 
de-leveraging, caused strong output losses and frequently induced long-lasting 
deleterious effects on the aggregate investment rate.  
• Currency and term mismatches played a role in nurturing financial disequilibria.  
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• The government acted as insurer of last resort and the fiscal imbalances 
provoked by the bailout of the banking system tended to erode public debt 
sustainability and ultimately impinged on political legitimacy.  
• The authorities were unable to implement appropriate anti-cyclical policies in a 
context in which capital flows tended to behave pro-cyclically. 
 
In light of these facts, the authorities in the region began to include macro-prudential 
rules in the regulatory framework, together with more traditional micro rules, such as 
capital adequacy. One important goal was to induce reductions in the share of dollar-
denominated liabilities held by both the private and public sectors. In an effort to reduce 
fiscal vulnerability, many countries introduced fiscal responsibility tools aimed at 
eliminating pro-deficit bias. The most sophisticated, like Chile, introduced structural 
fiscal rules oriented to smoothing the pro-cyclical patterns, which proved to be inherent 
to deregulation in a context of incomplete and imperfect financial markets. This 
country, together with Brazil among others, also tried to use capital controls to smooth 
the effect of pro-cyclical capital movements.      
 
In sum, the experience with deregulation revealed that it had more to do with market 
creation than with market liberalization to the extent that it was necessary to build the 
institutional foundations of financial markets. Neither the LA governments nor the IFIs 
pushing for liberalization had sufficient expertise concerning this type of institutional 
change. It is no wonder that McKinnon, who had inspired the reforms in the 1970s, had 
stated a decade or so later that liberalizing markets was analogous to “walking through a 
minefield” (McKinnon, 1991).  It is also true, however, that LA countries showed some 
ability to learn from experience and began to develop the macro-prudential and 
macroeconomic tools to survive their minefields.   
 
Moreover, an increasing number of LA policy makers and academics reached the 
conclusion that “something” was wrong” with the governance of international financial 
transactions and/or the international monetary system. For one thing, domestic 
fundamentals alone could not account for episodes of contagion and sudden stops. In 
line with this conclusion, there were increasing demands for the IFIs to improve the 
mechanisms for international liquidity provision and the conditionality attached to IMF 
assistance. Four demands were forcefully voiced: one, liquidity provision under sudden 
stops and contagion should be timely and adequate; two, the size of assistance packages 
should take into consideration that liquidity requirements are higher when the capital 
account is open and private capital flows are pro-cyclical; three, the IFIs should not 
impose tight fiscal adjustments under stress, which accentuates pro-cyclicality; and 
four, conditioning the “global community’s” financial assistance to fiscal adjustment in 
a context in which unemployment and poverty are rising should be avoided because it 
undermines political legitimacy.   
 
These arguments, however, were only partially shared by the IFIs. On the one hand, the 
size of the assistance packages was increased to match the needs of economies that had 
liberalized the capital accounts. The stronger financial effort was justified because it 
was in the interest of all participants in the global markets to avoid contagion and 
spillover effects. But, on the other hand, the standard view continued to hold that the 
main sources of distortions and instability were weak domestic policies. A key mission 
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of the IFA was, therefore, to check for moral hazard. Loan conditionality had to be 
tough to deter national authorities from implementing bad policies or distortionary 
regulations, such as capital controls which could jeopardize foreign loans or the forced 
restructuring of debt obligations. In this way, conditionality had to perform a double 
duty: to provide liquidity under stress conditions and to act as a punishment to deter 
moral hazard. Striking a balance between these two objectives was not easy and the 
weight given to each changed substantially in line with changing political visions of the 
G-7.  
 
The Mexican rescue package is an important example of this trade-off. The international 
community assisted Mexico with a sizable “rescue package” but the authorities were 
required to pledge assets as collateral for external loans and to launch tough policy 
reforms. The primary cause of the problem was diagnosed as ill-suited Mexican policies 
rather than the flawed governance of international financial transactions. The goal of 
financial assistance was to minimize the externality costs associated with bad domestic 
policies and to induce the deviant country to implement policy reforms. An additional 
positive externality was to send signals to other would-be deviants that bad policies 
would be punished severely under the rules of the IFA.      
 
The developments in Asia in 1997, however, strengthened the argument that something 
was wrong with global governance and that, consequently, the approach to crisis 
prevention and resolution had to be updated. Three features of the Asian crises deserve 
mention in this regard. First, the 1997 Asian turmoil was largely unexpected, suggesting 
that both global private financial decision makers and the IFIs’ early warning systems 
were unreliable. Second, the crises occurred in a region that had been systematically 
praised for the quality of its pro-growth, market-friendly, and reasonable 
macroeconomic policies. Hence, it was only natural that other factors, in addition to 
domestic policies, had to be considered in assessing vulnerability to shocks. Financial 
regulations and supervision and weak corporate governance were prime suspects 
together with the soft fixing of the exchange rate. Third, unlike the LA experience, high 
growth had been the rule rather than the exception in the countries hit by the crisis. 
Hence, the costs of the pro-cyclical adjustment policies associated with IFIs’ 
conditionality were more apparent than in LA in detriment to the sense of legitimacy 
and policy ownership. Indeed, the Chiang Mai initiative can be interpreted as an effort 
to strengthen policy ownership and improve liquidity provision mechanisms by means 
of regional financial cooperation4.  
 
These facts led the international community to widen the focus: The rules that govern 
international financial transactions began to be considered part of the problem rather 
than the solution. Likewise, it was increasingly recognized that political legitimacy 
mattered to the IFA and some very timid steps were taken to strengthen both the voice 
and decision power of emerging countries. The creation of the G-20 as a forum to 
facilitate open discussion between industrial and emerging-market countries was 
                                                 
4 At the ASEAN+3 Summit in November 1999, regional leaders agreed to enhance “self-help and support 
mechanisms in East Asia” through the ASEAN+3 framework. At the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ 
Meeting in May 2000, finance ministers agreed to promote the Chiang Mai Initiative to establish a 
regional financial arrangement to supplement the existing international facilities. 
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expected to contribute to “strengthening the international financial architecture and 
providing opportunities for dialogue on national policies, international co-operation, and 
international financial institutions”. With regard to decision power in the IFIs, a process 
to change the governance of the Bretton Woods institutions was initiated, recognizing a 
problem of representation.   
 
In sum, a consensus began to take shape on the following points: one, the importance of 
reforming the IFA and the fact that global problems called for global responses; two, in 
a world of sudden stops and contagion, the conditionality attached to liquidity provision 
mechanisms should not impede a timely response; three, institutions matter to the 
governance of domestic and international financial transactions and, therefore, the 
global and national institution-building capacity must be strengthened. Furthermore, the 
Chiang Mai initiative suggested that the institutional works would probably include a 
regional layer.    
 
This process, however, rapidly lost momentum, in part as a consequence of the Russian 
crisis of 1998. In Russia, the attempt to stabilize the economy failed because a good part 
of the financial support stemming from the IFIs was channeled to finance capital flight 
and to favor specific stakeholders. Those who had forcefully called attention to the role 
of moral hazard had a strong case. The Argentine crisis in 2001-02 was further 
interpreted as evidence against rescue packages and the difficulties to commit. 
Overwhelmed by the demise of the convertibility regime, Argentina defaulted on its 
debt obligations in December 2001 after receiving a rescue package from the IMF at the 
beginning of 2001.   
 
Krueger (2003) well represents the more pessimistic view that arose after these 
episodes. She reached the conclusion that the IMF’s primary mission was crisis 
prevention and only for occasional cases–where crises cannot be prevented–crisis 
resolution. In line with this approach, the discussion about the new architecture lost 
momentum and was gradually supplanted by a renewed emphasis on the need to 
institute a “sustainable” domestic regime, which now included not only macroeconomic 
and financial policies but also the financial regulatory framework. In this new context, 
the IMF would oversee the internalization of the standards and codes promoted by the 
FSF, embracing two key areas: enhancing transparency and accountability and 
strengthening domestic financial systems. Although the institution-building tasks 
involved had been plagued with idiosyncratic difficulties, it was expected that the 
actions at the national level were made in collaboration with the joint Bank-Fund FSAP 
and the Reports on Standards and Codes (ROSC) initiative. The efforts to design 
appropriate packages for liquidity provision and crisis mitigation should shift the focus 
toward the “orderly restructuring” of sovereign debt, and the design of a set of rules to 
facilitate the resolution of conflict between creditors and debtors (Krueger, 2003). In 
this way, the still largely unsettled question of how the IMF and other IFIs should act to 
generate liquidity and facilitate debt restructuring in a crisis situation and thus avoid 
economic collapse in a given country was left aside.  
 
Under these circumstances an LA country–or, indeed, a country from any other region–
was finding it highly difficult to know how much help it could expect were it to suffer 
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from contagion or a sudden stop. The responses of the IFIs’ authorities for liquidity 
provision in the Turkish, Argentine, Uruguayan and Brazilian crises showed marked 
differences. Uncertainty was further fed by the lack of advancement in the proposals of 
the orderly restructuring of debt and conflict resolution. In 2003, Krueger recognized 
that, after a year of vigorous and constructive debates on the need to improve 
arrangements to resolve financial crises, and in particular, to establish the tools to 
restructure sovereign debt, this remained a “controversial topic” (2003). The only 
novelty regarding this was that some countries introduced collective action clauses in 
their new debt issues. These were certainly too weak a response to the coordination 
failure problems posed by debt restructuring and, more generally, to the need for clearer 
and transparent rules for the governance of international financial transactions. It is no 
wonder that the IMF itself lost weight in the international arena. In the years preceding 
the 2008 crisis, many countries reimbursed the loans and the institution credit portfolio 
shrank.   
 
The Progress Report on the IFA produced by the World Bank Staff in 2005 (World 
Bank, 2005) is very telling with regard to the lack of substantial progress concerning the 
governance of international transactions. It is interesting that this Report also called 
attention to a number of new developments in the emerging world. The Report stressed 
that emerging markets have become net capital exporters and that two key foundations 
behind such a pattern were: (i) a noticeable shift from external to domestic borrowing in 
public debt across a broad range of emerging markets, reflecting movements of existing 
debt; and (ii) the accumulation of large amounts of international reserves by several 
emerging markets to self-insure against financial crises, reflecting the attempts to 
prevent nominal exchange rate appreciation in the face of increasing capital inflows. 
The Report expressed concerns about the costs of this new strategy: reserve 
accumulation was constraining growth through investment levels below trend.  
 
This brief review of the experience of LA and other emerging countries with the IFA 
suggests a number of conclusions that are relevant to our analysis. One, in the first half 
of the 2000s, the IFIs favored the diagnosis that the global problems–liquidity 
provision, contagion–would stem from individual policy responses. The mission of the 
IFIs was to help emerging countries to internalize the global rules of the game. The 
institutions were global in the sense that they were being replicated everywhere on the 
basis of a shared blueprint. They were not global in the sense that they had to address 
global coordination, beyond the mission of addressing the cheap-talk-like pre-
coordination activity of spreading the same standards and codes everywhere. In the case 
of LA countries, a macro regime was one more factor: inflation targeting plus fiscal 
rules for large countries and hard pegs or dollarization for the smaller ones that were 
more integrated with the USA or with an inflationary past. This assumed that liquidity 
and crisis resolution were not the primary problems to be addressed. If the FSF-
recommended standards and codes were internalized, there would be a market-driven 
solution for the problems of debt restructuring. Two, emerging markets did not perceive 
that the coordination game that they were playing was one in which cheap-talk could 
help. When no country took the Contingent Credit Line and the IMF let it expire in 
2003 without replacing it with a more effective liquidity provision mechanism, the IFIs 
de facto signaled that timely liquidity provision was not part of the payoff in the global 
game. But if the carrots (a timely provision of liquidity) did not exist, why should the 
country accept the threat of a stick (the restrictions attached to the IMF conditionality 
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and the overseeing via FSAP) instead of trying a non-cooperative response (self-
insurance), which leaves much more policy space available?  In a nutshell: the IFIs’ 
change of paradigm at the beginning of the 2000s induced a dramatic change in the pay-
off matrix and it is no wonder that the equilibrium outcome also changed: under the new 
conditions, the IFA and the G-20 languished, ritually repeating–communiqué after 
communiqué–the benefits of strengthening policies and institutions in emerging 
countries.     
 
There were indications, however, that either the outcome was unstable or some policy 
makers were simply mistaken. That is, their responses were not the best given the 
constraint posed by the IFA (i.e. the lack of liquidity provision facilities). The concern 
about the stability was motivated by the persistence of the global imbalances (see 
Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti, 2009). The worries about the policy response stemmed 
from the fact that, while Asian and LA countries responded non-cooperatively, 
implementing a self-insurance strategy, the European periphery promptly increased its 
vulnerability, repeating some of the mistakes made by LA and Asia:  currency and term 
mismatching, large current account deficits, and misaligned exchange rates. Obviously, 
not everybody was right: if global financial governance and the IFA were as flawed as 
they had been, the strategy of the European periphery was unsuitable and the self-
insurance strategies followed in LA and Asia made sense. On the other hand, if the 
existing governance structures were basically fulfilling their functions, the latter 
strategy was too conservative and costly.     
 
With the benefit of hindsight, we can hypothesize that the pay-off of the self-insurance 
strategy was higher. One indication of this is that the LA countries were far better 
prepared to resist contagion than in the past precisely because they played the non-
cooperative self-insurance strategy while there was a succession of instability episodes 
in the European periphery. Another indication is that many European countries have 
received assistance from the IMF, who had to return to its traditional function as lender 
of last resort. As was the case in LA and Asia in the nineties, the IMF organized rescue 
packages for several countries (see IMF, 2009a).  
 
The superiority of the self-insurance strategy vis-à-vis individual countries does not 
make it optimal concerning global welfare. It is a costly strategy, which generates 
negative externalities in terms of financial and trade imbalances. This suggests that 
there is probably room for improvement. But this means that the agenda for the IFA 
reform needs revitalizing. Certainly, that the G-20 is now much more proactive and that 
the IMF has launched new facilities for timely liquidity provision are clear signals that 
the reform agenda that derailed in the early 2000s is now on track. Of course, a highly 
counterfactual but still relevant question is what would have happened with world 
imbalances if the IFA reform agenda had not been downplayed in the early 2000s.   
The pre-2008-crisis view of the IFA contrasts with the current view of the organizations 
that manage the IFA (see, Blanchard et al., 2009; Claessens et al., 2009; IMF, 2010; 
Mateos et al., 2010; Ostry et al., 2010). For example, the IMF (IMF, 2009b) has drawn 
the following “initial lessons”– the crisis has revealed important flaws in the current 
global architecture. The document focuses the criticism on four key areas: 
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(1) Surveillance of systemic risk, which needs to be reoriented to ensure warnings are 
clear and to provide practical advice to policy makers; (2) International coordination of 
macro-prudential responses to systemic risk. It is necessary to improve the 
arrangements that govern collective policy decisions, involving forums such as the 
International Monetary and Financial Committee, the Financial Stability Forum, and the 
various “Gs”; (3) Cross-border arrangements for financial regulation. It is necessary to 
avoid regulatory arbitrage and a repetition of the “go-it-alone” responses seen in this 
crisis; (4) Funding for liquidity support or external adjustment. Public funds from the 
Fund and others are needed to help countries weather short-term liquidity strains, or to 
smooth necessary adjustments from unsustainable external trajectories. Given the size 
of international transactions, these resources should be augmented, and processes for 
providing short-term liquidity better defined. 
 
Indeed, the bulk of these lessons could have been drawn from the observation of the 
Latin American experience or, for that matter, of other important emerging regions, 
notably Asia. But, as we have seen, at the beginning of the 2000s there was a marked 
shift in the IFIs’ view concerning collective action. The problem of limiting moral 
hazard in lending received much more attention as compared with other goals, such as 
the provision of international liquidity and crisis resolution. The IFIs did not pay 
sufficient attention to the problem of the recurrence of “disruptive adjustments” and its 
implications for global inefficiencies. This led to an incorrect diagnosis and, therefore, 






On coordination and global institution building 
 
 
Undoubtedly, the purpose of restoring global financial stability and overcoming the 
threat of a worldwide depression is the main motivation behind the current international 
community’s efforts to improve the IFA. The G-20 declaration in the Washington 
summit is particularly telling in this regard: it states the group’s determination to 
enhance the cooperation with respect to two goals: “to restore global growth and 
achieve needed reforms in the world’s financial systems”. Moreover, the G-20 
declaration provides clues about why global, coordinated actions are required rather 
than individual initiatives: “a broader policy response is needed based on closer 
macroeconomic cooperation to restore growth, avoid negative spillovers and support 
emerging economies and developing countries”. From our analysis it follows, however, 
that the fulfillment of these goals will face significant obstacles. Based on the Latin 
American experience, we have highlighted the role of institutional change, the large 
scope of the reforms in the governance structures involved and the problems of defining 
an incentive structure that can promote collective action at the global level. We will 
now discuss some conclusions referring to these issues, trying to pinpoint the possible 
contribution that regional policy dialogue and arrangements can make to reform the 
IFA.   
  
The current IFA has failed to align the interests of global players and avoid the sub-
optimal outcomes associated with self-insurance strategies and the imbalances that fed 
the crises. It failed to deliver what is essential: an effective framework for the 
governance of international financial transactions.  
 
One key strategic flaw of the approach to the IFA during the second globalization was 
that crisis-prevention, as well as crisis-resolution, initiatives emphasized the emerging 
economies’ side of the problem to the detriment of the treatment of the developed-side 
distortions.  
 
The crisis-prevention initiatives focused on reforming the emerging countries’ DFA and 
overlooked the developed counterparts. More specifically, beyond cheap-talk, the bulk 
of the efforts was biased toward creating incentives for developing countries to reform 
their institutions following the FSF standards and codes and the IMF-WB guidelines for 
macroeconomic policy reforms. The main strategy to provide incentives was to tie IFIs’ 
credit to the implementation of “structural and policy reforms”. With respect to 
developed countries, it was basically assumed that both the incentive structure facing 
international conglomerates and the domestic policy and regulatory frameworks were 
suitable to produce a global cooperative outcome, provided that emerging economies 
succeeded at reforming their DFAs. The G-7 DFAs were deemed appropriate not only 
to check for moral hazard in financial transactions but also to avoid free riding in the 
global arena (via regulatory arbitrage) and to internalize spillover effects (contagion).  
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The efforts to create mechanisms for crisis resolution and liquidity provision under 
stress were also biased toward emerging markets. For example, no contingent plans had 
been designed to address the occurrence of a sudden stop or a credit crunch in 
developed markets. A sovereign debt restructuring mechanism and collective action 
clauses were tailored responses for debt-default events in the developing world.  
 
Hence, those global actors who had sufficient decision power to influence the design of 
the IFAs’ rules acted as if they could achieve cooperation and supersede the observed 
sub-optimal outcomes by changing the rules of the game for just one of the parties. Of 
course, this would be a sensible strategy if emerging countries’ authorities acted as 
delegates of developed countries. But in a world of sovereign states and governments 
with differing constituencies, this was not the case. In the post-colonial world, “hard” 
enforcement instruments are very scarce and costly and the rules of the game must 
largely be self-imposed. It is a world in which only “soft” enforcing mechanisms–such 
as reputation costs, shared “global” values or the menace to cut access to contingent 
liquidity facilities and cheap credit from IFIs–are available. Therefore, it is an 
environment in which commitment is difficult and thus coordination failures and free 
riding are difficult to overcome.  
 
The ultimate result of the one-sided and biased strategy for building the institutions of 
the global economy was that the rules of the game failed to induce the cooperative 
global outcome. Under the flawed IFA of the early 2000s, the strategic choice of major 
LA and other emerging countries was “self-insurance”, making their contribution to the 
suboptimal global imbalances. Meanwhile, large global financial conglomerates and 
deficit-prone developed countries were playing in an institutional environment that was 
permeable to moral hazard.  
 
Global institutional change is necessary, but how can institutional change occur? There 
are basically two alternatives. One is that, given the post-crisis conditions, the new 
regime results spontaneously from the strategic interactions of the national, regional and 
multilateral players involved. The recent crisis, nonetheless, does not leave much room 
for optimism: it suggests that there can still be instability factors at work and, as a 
consequence, the global economy could end up in a low-equilibrium financial trap in 
which international financial flows are reduced to a minimum. The second alternative is 
voluntary reform, that is, the introduction of new rules for the governance of financial 
flows so as to change the structure of incentives that led to the crisis. The problem with 
this alternative is that no formal international polity exists to set the goals that will be 
pursued with the new rules and enforce them. Under these conditions, the problem of 
designing the reform of the IFA is, essentially, to find a set of rules that all the players 
can willingly accept, given the existing distribution of political and economic power. 
The resulting institutional framework should be self-enforcing.  
 
Proposals have been advanced to change the rules of the game but it will be difficult to 
reach an agreement about new rules without taking into account their ultimate 
distributional effects. Different rules of the game have different distributional 
consequences and the consensus on this cannot be taken for granted. To be sure, it is 
central to ensure that the strategic interactions that took place in the global economy 
produce the most efficient equilibrium outcome possible. But the problem of designing, 
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implementing, and enforcing an appropriate set of rules is relevant only if there is at 
least some political consensus on the nature of the desired outcome.   
 
In light of the current imbalances and financial disequilibria it is clear that those reforms 
that can help to deal with disruptive adjustments should be given priority on the IFA 
agenda. However, it must be taken into account that a sense of policy and institution 
ownership is vital for the countries involved to accept the rules of an IFA designed to 
induce the cooperative global equilibrium. An effective way of making the sense of 
ownership stronger within the international community is to strengthen the participation 
of developing countries in the governance of the organizations that design and manage 
the rules and organizations of the IFA. This indicates that strengthening ownership will 
come at a price for those countries that concentrate today’s global decision power: 
emerging countries will seek to define rules for the global game that are more suitable 
to their goals, which includes achieving domestic financial development and, ultimately, 
catching up with the developed countries’ per capita GDP.  
 
Of course, there will also be benefits. To begin with, ownership is a key ingredient in 
political legitimacy and a legitimate IFA is more likely to induce self-enforcing. 
Second, it is in the interest of developed countries to create conditions that are 
beneficial for growth in the emerging world. According to the IMF projections, 
emerging countries are likely to explain the lion’s share of future global growth. Third, 
improving institutional quality and reducing volatility in the emerging world will open 
new investment opportunities. If institutional spillover effects were internalized, the 
world’s investment opportunities would improve. Many profitable investment projects 
are currently unexploited because of appropriability problems or excessive risks 
associated with macro volatility and disruptive adjustments. Opening new opportunities 
can help industrialized countries to allocate their savings better, reducing the occurrence 
of new savings gluts in the developed world. The depression of investment in Asia and 
other emerging economies after the succession of crises in the 1990s may have 
contributed to feeding global imbalances and bubbles in the 2000s.     
 
The fact that the rules for the global governance must be self-enforced brings to the fore 
the problem of political legitimacy. It is important to create (or improve the existing) 
institutional spaces that can be instrumental at undertaking negotiations and 
harmonizing the goals of countries belonging to different categories. We have 
emphasized the differences between the G-7 and emerging countries but that is just one 
possible cleavage. Dialogue and the formation of coalitions at the regional level based 
on existing arrangements may be a useful intermediate step to harmonize the interest of 
the countries involved in the global game.  
 
The problems associated with collective action aimed at institution building and policy 
coordination suggest that the IFA reforms must adopt a systemic institutional approach 
embracing the national, regional, and multilateral instances. The regional platform for 
building the rules of the global game can show comparative advantages in building 
policy ownership and political legitimacy. The limits of the authority and mandates of 
the organizations that must apply the rules of the IFA are inherently fuzzy. The Chiang 
Mai and the European experiences suggest that regional arrangements may contribute to 
building the IFAs’ rules.  
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Legitimacy is central to policy ownership and this, in turn, is central to preventing free 
riding and regulatory arbitrage, which are public enemies of coordination. This is where 
regions have a role. The IFA has primarily to do with rules, but it also has to do with 
organizations to coordinate and manage the global system.  
 
The development of stronger regional centers based on promoting financial deepening 
via regional integration can help to avoid an important flaw in the functioning of the 
system, which was evident in the pre-crisis period. Note that one cause of the reduction 
in the interest rates that fed the bubble was the increase in the demand for safe assets. 
These assets are basically “produced” by the USA, whose markets are deeper and more 
liquid. This means that, under the current system, a liquid and safe global portfolio 
cannot be well diversified because there is only one seller of such assets. By increasing 
market liquidity the development of regional financial centers could help investors to 
diversify their portfolios.    
 
Among the issues to be treated at regional levels are: tools to deal with contagion that 
usually have a regional component; swap agreements with the central banks that issue 
reserve currencies could be negotiated so as to cover regional needs under contagion; 
financial support for development can be channeled through regional banks; and 
common pool arrangements can contribute to saving valuable resources.    
 
Three policy goals associated with the building of the DFA from the Latin American 
region’s point of view are: achieving deeper integration with the global economy, 
developing financial intermediation in a stable environment, and preserving 
macroeconomic stability. These goals are shared by the entire region and, therefore, 
regional initiatives to promote these goals should, in principle, be easy to develop. The 
three largest economies of the region participate in the G-20 and this could be a 
valuable instance for policy dialogue with the G-7 so as to ensure a balance between 
development goals and the need to check for moral hazard in lending, avoiding the 
biases that led to self-insurance. Efficiency, distribution, and institution-building are 
typically separate factors in economic analysis. But they are difficult to separate under 
the current circumstances. To solve the existing coordination failures and achieve a 
favorable global outcome, emerging countries must have incentives to participate. This 
means that the benefits provided by the new IFA in terms of growth and stability must 
exceed the benefits of the self-insurance, “isolationist” strategies. If the rules of the 
game were already defined, it would be easier to calculate the payoffs associated with 
alternative strategies. But the rules of the game are being defined now. Consequently, it 
is not just a problem of choosing between available strategies but of trying and defining 
the rules themselves. The ability to participate in establishing the rules of the game is 
directly related to the political importance of the country or region. Some actors will be 
leaders; others will be followers. Thus, it would be useful for the region or segments of 
the region to explore the option of coalitions to compound the political leverage of the 
group. The political economy constraints matter when it comes down to delineating 
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